In the decoherent histories approach to quantum theory, attention focuses on the conditions under which probabilities may be assigned to sets of quantum histories. A variety of conditions have been proposed, but the most important one is decoherence, which means that the interference between every pair of histories in the set is zero. Weaker conditions have been considered, such as consistency, or linear positivity, but these are ruled out by the requirement of consistent composition of subsystems, proposed by Diósi. Here we propose a new condition which we call partial decoherence, and is the requirement that every history has zero interference with its negation. This is weaker than decoherence and stronger than linear positivity (but its relation to consistency is less simply defined -it is neither stronger nor weaker). Most importantly, it satisfies the Diósi condition. A strengthened Diósi condition is proposed, which partial decoherence narrowly fails, due to an unusual property of inhomogeneous histories. In an appendix an example is given of a set of histories which are consistent but not decoherent.
I. INTRODUCTION
The decoherent histories approach to quantum theory has proved to be a very useful viewpoint from which to address the emergence of classical behaviour from quantum theory and also for analyzing the conceptual structure of quantum theory itself [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] . The central idea is to determine the conditions under which probabilities may be assigned to histories of a closed system and then to examine the predictions of those probabilities. A variety of different probability assignment conditions have been proposed, of differing strengths and mathematical consequences. A significant step in discriminating between these conditions was made by Diósi, who proposed that any such condition should satisfy certain reasonable requirements of statistical independence when applied to composite systems consisting of non-interacting independent subsystems [11] . This reduced the number of different probability assignment conditions to just one, namely diagonality of the decoherence functional, a condition we will refer to as decoherence of histories (or more simply, decoherence). For a pure initial state, this is equivalent to demanding that the states corresponding to each history should be orthogonal.
The work described in this paper arose as a result of the realization that it is possible to weaken the condition of decoherence and still pass the Diósi test. This weakened condition is called partial decoherence and for a pure initial state it is the requirement that the state for each history is orthogonal to the state representing the negation of that history. However, this new condition invites a revisiting of the Diósi test and a strengthened version of the test is considered. Partial decoherence narrowly fails to pass this strengthened test so is ultimately unsatisfactory. These considerations underscore decoherence of histories as the most important (and possibly only) viable condition for the assignment of probabilities to histories and we discuss the physical reasons why this is the case.
At the encouragement of the editors, this paper is a speculative exploration of ideas in progress, rather than a report of significant new results, so may come across as incomplete in some parts.
2

II. THE DECOHERENT HISTORIES APPROACH
In quantum theory, alternatives at each moment of time are represented by a set of projection operators {P a }, satisfying the conditions a P a = 1
(1)
where we take a to run over some finite range. In the decoherent histories approach to quantum theory [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] , the simplest type of history, a homogenous history, is represented by a class operator C α which is a time-ordered string of projections
Here the projections are in the Heisenberg picture and α denotes the string (a 1 , · · · a n ). We take α to run over N values so there are N histories. The class operator Eq.(3) satisfies the
and also
Probabilities are assigned to histories via the formula
which is in essence the usual Born rule generalized to histories. These probabilities are clearly positive and normalized
which follows from Eq.(5).
It is also natural to consider more complicated histories which are given by sums of strings of projection operators of the form Eq.(3). These are called inhomogenous histories and typically do not satisfy Eq.(5), so their probabilities do not sum to 1 in general α p(α) = 1 (8) and in fact the individual probabilities may be greater than 1 [12] . (But the probabilities do sum to 1 when there is decoherence, discussed below). This difference between homogeneous and inhomogeneous histories turns out to be important in what follows.
As the double slit experiment indicates, the assignment of probabilities to histories in quantum mechanics is not always possible. For the p(α) to be true probabilities the histories must satisfy certain conditions which, loosely speaking, ensure that there are no interference effects. To this end, we introduce the decoherence functional
which may be thought of as a measure of interference between pairs of histories. It satisfies the conditions
and note that the probabilities are given by its diagonal elements
The simplest and most important condition normally imposed is that the probabilities should satisfy the probability sum rules, that is, that they are additive for all disjoint pairs of histories. More precisely, the probability of history α or history α ′ must be the sum of p(α) and p(α ′ ). Since this combination of histories is represented by the class operator
Hence for the probabilities to satisfy the expected sum rules we require that
for all pairs of histories α, α ′ . This condition is called consistency of histories, and if there are 
This stronger condition is related to the existence of records [2, 8] . For a pure initial state it means that we can add an extra projection operator R γ at the end of the history which is perfectly correlated with the alternatives at earlier times. That is
which implies that
so that the probabilities for histories reduce entirely to a projection at a single moment of time. This corresponds to the idea that there exists a record at fixed moment of time somewhere in the system, like a photographic plate, which carries complete information about the entire history of the system.
There appear to be very few examples of situations where the histories are consistent but not decoherent (but one simple example is given in the Appendix). This another reason why it is natural to impose the requirement of decoherence.
It is now useful to define the quasi-probability,
Because it is linear in the C α , this quantity sums to 1 and also satisfies the probability sum rules, but it is not in general a real number. However, it is closely related to the probabilities Eq.(6), because Eq.(4) implies that
HereC α denotes the negation of the history C α ,
This means that when there is decoherence we have that the probabilities are given by the simpler expression
Decoherence therefore ensures that q(α) is real and positive, even though it is not in general.
These properties of q(α) inspired Goldstein and Page [13] to suggest a formulation of quantum theory in which the probabilities are given by Re q(α), subject only to the requirement that
a condition they refer to as linear positivity. These clearly agree with the usual assignments p(α) when there is consistency, but this condition is weaker than consistency so the reverse is not true.
These three conditions -decoherence, consistency and linear positivity -are the main probability assignment conditions that have been discussed in the literature. However, this
is not an exhaustive list. Hartle, for example, has discussed probability assignments in terms of the possibility of settling bets [14] . Also, a number of different versions of the condition of decoherence exist [15] . We will not pursue these developments here.
III. PARTIAL DECOHERENCE -A NEW CONDITION
The first aim of this paper is to note that there is in fact a fourth condition for the assignment of probabilities which is weaker than decoherence, but stronger than linear positivity.
It is neither stronger nor weaker than consistency.
Consider again steps Eq. (18)- (21) which relate the p(α) and the q(α). The proposed new condition is to require that the histories satisfy Eq.(21) for all α. Since q(α) is complex in general the condition may be written
Im q(α) = 0 (24) 6 so there are 2N conditions. From Eq.(19), it is equivalent to the condition
for all α. This means that every history has zero interference with its negation, but there will still be pairs of histories whose decoherence functional is non-zero in its off-diagonal terms.
It is therefore natural to call this new condition partial decoherence. Partial decoherence is clearly weaker than decoherence. It is stronger than linear positivity, since q(α) is explicitly set to equal a real, positive number. 
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Note also that all four conditions may be written as simple restrictions on the decoherence functional, and for conciseness, all four are listed below in the order decoherence, partial decoherence, consistency and linear positivity:
IV. THE DIÓSI TEST
This multitude of conditions raises the question, which of them are necessary for a consistent formulation of the quantum theory of histories? An important step in answering this question was made by Diósi [11] . He proposed the reasonable requirement that any assignment of probabilities must behave in a reasonable way for statistically independent subsystems. More precisely,
The Diósi Test: Suppose a composite system consists of a number of statistically independent subsystems. Then any condition for the assignment of the probabilities applied to the subsystems must imply the same condition for the composite system. 
From this we see that the condition of decoherence passes the Diósi test, but consistency fails -the requirement Eq. (14) on the subsystems does not imply the same requirement on the composite system because
Similarly, we have that
so the linear positivity condition Eq.(22) on subsystems does not imply linear positivity on composite system. This clearly rules out consistency and linear positivity as reasonable conditions for the assignment of probabilities to histories [16] .
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Now the important question is whether partial decoherence satisfies the Diósi condition.
For a composite system, both p AB (α, β) and q AB (α, β) factor, and our condition Eq.(21)
This condition will clearly hold if Eq.(21) holds for each subsystem so the Diósi condition is satisfied.
Given that consistency fails the Diósi test and decoherence passes it, one might have thought that a condition satisfying the Diósi test must necessarily be stronger than consistency, but partial decoherence disproves this idea, being neither stronger nor weaker than it, just different.
V. A STRENGTHENED DIÓSI TEST
The Diósi Test, as stated above, is sufficient to rule out linear positivity and consistency, but does not rule out partial decoherence. This state of affairs may be satisfactory, but it is of interest to revisit the Diósi test and ask whether a strengthened version should be considered. In its original statement, the logical implication in the Diósi test goes in one direction only: the condition on subsystems must imply the same condition on the composite system. But should the condition also satisfy a similar test with the reverse implication?
We refer to such a test as:
The Reverse Diósi Test: Suppose a composite system consists of a number of statistically independent subsystems. Then any condition for the assignment of the probabilities applied to the composite system must imply the same condition for each subsystem.
It seems reasonable to require that any probability assignment condition should satisfy both Diósi tests. The argument for the reverse test is quite different to the original one. It is actually about coarse graining and is essentially the requirement that any conditions for the assignment of probabilities to histories must be preserved in form under coarse grainings.
It is easy to see that decoherence passes the Reverse Diósi Test, but consistency and linear positivity fail it. What about partial decoherence? Does Eq.(33) imply Eq.(21) for each subsystem? This is more subtle than the previous cases. Summing over β we obtain
We now see that the desired result depends on whether the histories are homogeneous or inhomogeneous. For homogeneous histories
and it follows that p A (α) = q A (α) (and similarly for B), as desired.
For inhomogenous histories, we sum Eq.(34) over α, to obtain
If A consists of homogenous histories, then its probabilities sum to 1 which forces the histories of B to sum to 1. The Diósi condition is then satisfied. However, if both A and B consist of inhomogeneous histories, then Eq.(36) may be satisfied without the probabilities of either system summing to 1 (and recall that the probabilities do not necessarily need to sum to 1 for inhomogeneous histories). Eqs. (36) and (34) may be combined to read
This is a consistent relationship between q and p but narrowly falls short of satisfying the condition of partial decoherence for the subsystem, so the Reverse Diósi Test is not satisfied in this case. The heart of the difficulty here is that for inhomogenous histories and statistically independent subsystems, the relation Eq.(36) does not imply that the subsystem probabilities sum to 1.
One could contemplate requiring that the Reverse Diósi Test is restricted to identical or near-identical susbystems. This would mean that the subsystem probabilities must sum to the same (or almost the same) value, which could be greater than 1 or less than 1, but Eq.(36) would then force both probabilities to sum to 1. But there is no obvious reason for restricting to near-identical susbystems.
The failure of partial decoherence to fully pass this test hinges around the unusual properties of inhomogeneous histories. At present no general statements are known about the sums of their probabilities (in the absence of decoherence). That is, one would like to know whether p = 1 is a generic feature or one that can happen only in exceptional circumstances. This part of the story remains unclear.
VI. ANOTHER TEST: ROBUSTNESS UNDER CHANGE OF DYNAMICS
Diósi also considered another test that any probability assignment condition ought to satisfy [11] . Suppose we apply some sort of external field to the physical system so producing a perturbation in the Hamiltonian. One can imagine that such a perturbation could be chosen to be essentially classical -i.e., in such a way that it does not introduce extra quantum coherence. Clearly any probability assignment condition should be robust under such a perturbation, meaning that it should not change in form.
Diósi gave a specific example of such a perturbation acting at just one moment of time t k and argued that it produces a change in the class operators of the form
where λ α k is a real number and U k is a unitary operator whose exact form is not required here. The decoherence functional then changes according to
Clearly the condition of decoherence is preserved under this transformation, but consistency and linear positivity are not. Partial decoherence also appears to fail this test since p(α) is preserved but q(α) changes.
This test does not appear to have been investigated much beyond the few simple observations made here and its status is less clear than the other tests described above. It seems to be related to the general idea that the decoherent histories approach concerns the question of determining those situations to which to probabilities can be assigned independently of whether the system is actually measured. Indeed the specific example of a perturbation given above is exactly of the form of a physical measurement.
One wonders whether both this test and the previous tests involving subsystems are examples of a more general set of requirements concerning classicality-preserving operations which one would expect any probability assignment condition to satisfy. This would be of interest to investigate in the future.
VII. DISCUSSION
The account of decoherent histories presented here confirms decoherence, diagonality of the decoherence functional, as the only sensible condition for the assignment of probabilities for histories. Partial decoherence comes close, but fails in some subtle ways related to the properties of inhomogeneous histories. Consistency and linear positivity fail very clearly to be satisfactory.
Decoherence has a nice geometric picture in that (for pure states) it corresponds to orthogonality of the set of states {C α |ψ }. The robustness test particularly recommends this picture since the transformation Eq.(38) implies a unitary transformation on the states C α |ψ under which all orthogonality properties are preserved. To see why the orthogonality of these states should be important one needs to look at the underlying mechanisms which cause any of the probability assignment conditions to become satisfied. There are essentially two such mechanisms.
The first relates to conservation, either in terms of a system-environment split (where one system is much slower than the other, so its variables are approximately conserved), or in terms of local densities, which are approximately conserved when averaged over large volumes. When there is decoherence due to conservation, the decoherence of histories comes about essentially because there exist certain states which are preserved in form by the action of the class operator C α , and thus the set of states of the form C α |ψ are orthogonal [17] .
The second mechanism is to do with statistics (and also arises in the situation where there is a system environment split, but at much finer-grained scales than the conservation situation described above). The point here is that for large systems, any pair of "typical"
states will tend to be approximately orthogonal.
In both cases, therefore, the mechanisms producing decoherence refer to orthogonality of states, which is why decoherence functional diagonality has such a central role.
There are however, certain issues that remain incompletely understood. As stated earlier, the physical mechanisms that cause the probability assignment conditions to become satisfied tend to produce decoherence, and not just partial decoherence or consistency. This actually means that, if there is a physical mechanism present such as conservation or an environment, then it might be sufficient in practice to check only that one of the weaker conditions holds, such as partial decoherence, since the above argument suggests that full decoherence will then probably hold too. Indeed, one of the motives for investigating partial decoherence is that it is in practice much simpler to check than the diagonality of the whole decoherence functional. It would be of interest to make these vague ideas more precise. For example, one wonders if it is possible to write down a simple auxiliary condition which signifies in a general way the presence of a physical decoherence mechanism, such as conservation or an environment, but without explicitly identifying the mechanism. Such an auxiliary condition, adjoined to partial decoherence or consistency might then be equivalent to full decoherence.
Differently put, the question is the following: can the condition of decoherence be split into two conditions in a useful way: partial decoherence (or consistency), plus some other auxiliary condition reflecting the underlying physical mechanism? (The existence of records is an example of a possible auxiliary condition but this is probably too strong for what is being suggested here). These ideas will be pursued elsewhere. 
COHERENCE
The following is a simple example of a situation in which there is exact consistency but the imaginary part of the decoherence functional is non-zero so there is no decoherence.
We consider at system which has two alternatives at each moment of time denoted by the projectors P andP = 1 − P . A useful example to visualize is the case of a point particle with projections onto the positive or negative x-axis.
We consider histories characterized by alternatives at two moments of time, t 1 , t 2 , and we introduce Heisenberg picture projectors,
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Then we consider a pair of (inhomogeneous) histories represented by the class operators
In the case of projections onto the positive and negative x-axis, C represents the statement that the particle is on the same side of x = 0 at both t 1 and t 2 .C represents the statement that the particle at time t 2 is on the side of x = 0 opposite to that it was on at t 1 .
The real part of the off-diagonal term of the decoherence functional is given by,
It is easy to see that
Hence, ReD = 0, although ImD is generally non-zero. The set of histories is therefore exactly consistent for any initial state but generally not decoherent.
The significance of this example is not clear, although the class operatorC gives a crude semiclassical description of crossing the origin during a given time interval, and as such may be relevant to the decoherent histories analysis of the arrival time problem [18] . This will be investigated elsewhere.
